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ship were the years the locusts ate,
Sam Rayburn was five feet six inches
tall. Yet his bulk looms far larger over
American politics of the past half centu-
ry than O'Neill's, The partisan character
of the office of Speaker was apparently
intended by the Founding Fathers, as
was demonstrated by Mary P, FoUett's
The Speaker of the House of Representatives
(1896), the classic work on the history of
the office. This represented a clear break
from the British tradition that the
Speaker should be a non-partisan pre-
siding officer. In gathering power to the
office. Clay and Reid and Cannon rein-
forced its partisan character. The power
and the partisanship went together. But
even men as partisan as Cannon and
Longworth, both Republicans, used their
power to bend and educate their own
party, just as Rayburn did. In the end,
O'Neill had the partisanship, but he did
not have confidence in the power of the
House, and of his office,
HENRY FAIRLIE
WHEEL OF FORTUNE
The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market
by George Soros
(Simon and Schuster, 350 pp,, $22.95)
George Soros is an investment manager.
But he is not your run-of-the-mill Wall
Street gnome. He has made it like no
one has. For those of us who wince
when the Dow Jones average interrupts
our daily television news, the jacket
blurb describes Soros's spectacular suc-
cess. The Quantum Fund, over which
he presides, has grown from $4 million
in 1969 to over $2 billion today; it has
yielded a dizzying annual compound
growth rate of 45 percent over nearly
two decades. New York magazine, in
an unaccustomed lapse into cultivated
penmanship, was moved to describe
Soros as the "Michelangelo, Renoir, and
Beethoven of Wall Street all wrapped
into one."
Now that Soros has made his fortune,
he is eager to tell all. But his aspirations
as a writer soar above a simple narrative
of his financial dealings. He wants to
think big, to speculate about the differ-
ences between scientific method in eco-
nomics and in the natural sciences. He
wishes to develop a theory that would
embrace equally his mundane financial
activities and grander themes such as the
reform of the intemational economic
system. It is tempting to treat Soros's an-
alytic ambition as a manifestation of
what sociologists call the Sanskritization
process: wealth seeks status by acquiring
the attributes of the higher classes—in
this instance, their intellectual pursuits.
But for Soros, the sequence has been ex-
actly reversed.
A Hungarian emigre to the United
States, Soros claims to have acquired
his thirst for intellectual accomplish-
ment en route, at the London School of
Economics, He credits the influence of
Karl Popper, but surely an economics
undergraduate in England cannot have
failed to note that financial and philo-
sophical speculation have been com-
bined in some of the great masters of
the discipline, David Ricardo—to whom
we owe the theory of gains from trade
through specialization, a theory that
Adam Smith sketched and Richard
Gephardt foolishly (if unwittingly) re-
jects—was a successful stockbroker.
Even John Maynard Keynes, as first
bursar of King's College at Cambridge
from 1924 to 1946, managed two invest-
ment funds to great advantage. Indeed,
of these, the Chest Fund, where Keynes
had a free hand, considerably outper-
formed the Banker's Magazine Ordinary
Share Index, Here was the stuff on
which dreams are made. Success on Wall
Street has given Soros the sangfroid, and
wealth the wherewithal, to pursue his
dream. This book is the consequence,
Alas, it prompts the question: Money
talks, but can it write?
The core of Soros's book is concerned
with what he wrongly (indeed, astonish-
ingly) considers to be a major new dis-
covery: the Theory of Reflexivity. If you
wish to be bamboozled, consider his
algebraic formulation. Let x = f(y) and
y = g(x)—that is, x is a function of y.
and the other way around, too. In class-
rooms we call this a system character-
ized by simultaneity. I have success-
fully conveyed what it means to my
students by recalling the country where
men are bad lovers and women yet
worse cooks, Reflexivity arises because
poor lovers are penalized by bad food,
and bad food is rewarded with indiffer-
ent love.
Soros uses reflexivity, however, with
an important but familiar twist, central
to his argument. Economic analysis
must reckon, he thinks, with the fact
that agents or "participants" understand
and act in light of the economic situa-
tion. This defines a "cognitive" relation-
ship. But their perceptions, in turn,
can affect the situation itself. This
defines a "participating" relationship.
And these cognitive and participating
functions (which correspond to Soros's
algebraic equations), acting recursively
(in sequence, that is), define "the theo-
retical foundation" of Soros's approach,
"The two recursive functions do not
produce an equilibrium but a never-
ending process of change," Hence, "the
outcome tends to diverge from expecta-
tions, leading to constantly changing
expectations and constantly changing
outcomes,"
Of course this is not really a "theorj'"
but a way of thinking, an analytical
framework that draws attention to the
critical role of feedback from subjec-
tive expectations to objective events.
Economists have been considering such
feedback for decades. The precise way
in which the objective reality can be af-
fected depends naturally on the nature
of the feedback. Consider the classic case
of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the analysis
of exchange rates dating back to the
1960s. Let the objective reality initially
be that the dollar will not depreciate. But
suppose that speculators expect the op-
posite, and move out of the dollar, de-
preciating it. If the reality were indepen-
dent of the actions of the speculators,
the dollar would go up again, and the
market would have chastised and ruined
the speculators. But it may well be that
as the dollar falls initially with the spec-
ulation, wages and hence prices rise in
sympathy. If so, the objective reality
would itself have changed, legitimating
the devaluation of the dollar in view of
the speculation-induced rise of prices.
Such self-justifying speculation shapes
its own reality.
Soros regards the stock market as an
ideal place for such feedback effects.
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Stock prices can influence "underlying
values," or "fundamentals" in Soros's
language, in important ways. An unjus-
tifiably high stock valuation, for exam-
ple, can reinforce a firm's ability to raise
finance and validate in tum the valua-
tion. As the research of Lawrence Sum-
mers and Robert Shiller on asset pricing
suggests, an unduly low valuation may
lead to managerial shakeouts aimed at
short-run profits and causing long-run
neglect, which once again legitimates the
initially inappropriate valuation. Evi-
dently, booms and busts also can follow,
for a vicious circle can arise in which one
mistake, duly rewarded, leads to another
until some overriding, unshakable con-
straint interrupts the process. Such re-
versals can come easily in financial mar-
kets, where confidence can evaporate as
rapidly as it arises.
I HAVE NO quarrel with Soros whenhe reminds us that the analysis of the
stock market must occasionally reckon
with such reflexivity. I find it difficult to
follow him completely, however, in his
different, and far more debatable, view
that his superior grasp of reflexivity is
what gives him the edge over his rivals.
Yes, he made a great deal of money dur-
ing the conglomerate boom of the 1960s
when reflexivity was working, with in-
discriminately high stock valuations
feeding the ballooning acquisition pro-
cess. But so did many others.
Or take the fascinating case of Soros's
THE PALM AT THE END
OF THE MIND
After fulfilling everything
one two three he came back again
free, no more prophecy requiring
that he enter the city just this way,
no more set-up treacheries. It was
the day after Easter, He adored
the egg-shell litter and the
cellophane caught in the grass.
Each door he passed swung with
its own business, all the witnesses
along his route of pain again
distracted by fear of loss or
hope of gain. It was wonderful
to be a man, bewildered by
so many flowers, the rush
and ebb of hours, his own
ambiguous gestures—his
whole heart exposed, then
taking cover,
KAY RYAN
"killing of a lifetime." After the Plaza
Hotel meeting of the Group of Five in
September 1985, Soros expected the yen
to rise; he bought into yen and earned in
one fell swoop more than enough to off-
set handsomely his accumulated losses
on currency trading in the previous four
years. Was this the result of reflexivity?
Surely Soros owed this good fortune to
guessing right about what these govern-
ments would do rather than to the re-
flexive effects of that deed in the mar-
ket, or his better grasp thereof.
Perhaps Soros has just been plain lucky
rather than smart. Having made money,
he is in no mood to attribute his success
to luck. But luck could well be what
made Soros's fortune, if we are to believe
the academic proponents of the so-called
"random walk" or "efficient markets"
theory of the stock market. That theory
holds that the market fully discounts all
future developments, and hence the indi-
vidual's chances of over- or underper-
forming the market are even, Soros as-
serts that this theory "is manifestly
false—I have disproved it by consistently
outperforming the averages over a period
of 12 years." Indeed, Warren Buffett,
who managed Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,
has outperformed the Standard & Poor
500 for each of 29 years.
As it happens, however, the random
walk theory permits Buffett and Soros to
have an impressive string of successes
without being in possession of better gray
cells. To understand this theory, consider
the analogy of tossing a coin: over a large
number of trials, heads will come up as
often as tails. But this does not rule out
the possibility that Soros has had an un-
mitigated succession of heads in all trials.
From the scientific point of view, it is
simply impossible to decide between
Soros's self-congratulatory "I-am-smart-
because-I-understand-reflexivity" ex-
planation and the rival "random walk"
explanations of his success just by read-
ing his accounts of his successes and fail-
ures. The issue remains as open and con-
tentious among professors as it is among
investors.
In TTie Alchemy of Finance, Soros goes
beyond the stock market to larger issues.
Though he offers an abundance of views,
on matters ranging from currency reform
to the American budget and trade defi-
cits, he reminds me of another distin-
guished Hungarian emigre. Lord Balogh,
of whom his foes said that his conclu-
sions were more obvious than his argu-
ments. Financial specialists, though, will
be intrigued by the conclusion that Soros
draws concerning the need to regulate fi-
nancial markets, ever susceptible (thanks
to reflexivity) to "excesses, which sooner
or later become unsustainable," In his
view, "after nearly half a century of what
now appears as excessive regulation, we
have been moving towards excessive de-
regulation. The sooner we recognize that
some kind of regulation is necessary in
order to maintain stability, the better are'
our chances of preserving the benefits of
a nearly free market system." Here he
parts company with Walter Wriston,
who cheerfully led us into the Third
World debt crisis, and walks over to Hen-
ry Kaufman's and Felix Rohatyn's corrter.
I believe rightly so,
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Jagdish Bhagwati is Arthur Lehman Pro-
fessor of Economics and professor of po-
litical science at Columbia University,
His new book. Protectionism: Interests, Idedl-
ogy, and Institutions, will be published by
MIT Press in 1988.
CORRESPONDENCE, from page 6
ago—opposing an assistant professor
candidate on the grounds of his noble
family background and good looks. Of
course this is absolutely untrue. It
is hard for me to take it too persons
ally, though, because the poor author





Ms, Skocpol, whose name was mis-
spelled by a typesetter, distorts iny
comments. I did not say that she 6p-.
posed a candidate because of his noble
family background or his good looks
but that, in view of these traits,
his achievements were "less than
they appeared," Hers was an argument
against someone comparatively advan-
taged, which is the reductio ad absur-
dum of arguments for those compara^
tively disadvantaged.
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